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purchaser in the shoes and subjects him to the equities (if any)
against the assignor thereof: XceJilton v. Love, 13 Ill. 495, and
cases cited; Cook & Sargent v. Burtis, 16 Iowa 194; Ballinger v. Tarbell, Id. 491; Crocker v. Isett, 18 Id.

Why should a

]Wrchase under it have any greater effect?
But the doctrine that the judgment is a nullity should be
strictly limited to cases wh6re there has been no service, and
where there is a total want of jurisdiction in the court, and a
total want of authority on the part of the attorney to appear. It
should not be extended to cases where an attorney, who has been
retained or regularly employed, has simply exceeded his authority.
J. F. D.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
THE STATE OF MARYLAND, TO THE USE OF MARY COUGHLAN,
v. THE BALTIMORE "AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY.
THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY v. THE STATE
OF MARYLAND, TO THE USE OF MARY COUGHLAN.
Distinction between Passengersand Strangers.-Railwaycompanies owe a higher
degree of watchfulness and care to those sustaining the relation of passengers, than
to mere strangers having no fiduciary relations with the company.
Distinction further defined.-In the former case the utmost care and skill is required, in order to avoid injuries; but in the latter case, only such as skilful, prudent, and discreet'persons, having the management of such business in such a
neighborhood, would naturally be expected to put forth.
Negligence of Plaintiff.-The plaintiff cannot recover for an injury resulting
from the negligence of the defendant, if, notwithstanding such negligence, he might
have avoided the injury by the exercise of care and prudence on his part, or if his
own want of guch care and prudence or that of the party injured, in any way contributed directly to the injury.
Damages.-In a case where the mother is to be compensated for the injury or
loss consequent upon the death of her infant child, the shock or suffering of feelings is not to be taken into the account, but only the pecuniary loss, and that is
not to be extended beyond the minority of the child.

TH Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company were the owners
of a track on Locust Point, in the City of Baltimore, and used a
locomotive for the regulation of the trains, picking up empty cars
and uniting them to be sent out on the main track. On the occa-
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sion in question, a train had been formed in this manner, consisting of many cars, and was being backed at a very slow speed
round a curve, on which were houses that prevented the engineman from seeing the back of the train or the end car. Two bays,
playing in the neighborhood, who saw the train in motion, ran
get a ride on the last car, catching hold of the bumper and wit
their feet on the brake bar. A jolt threw one off and he was
killed, while the other was badly injured, losing a part of one
hand. It was in proof that these boys had again and again been
driven from the cars on other occasions, and their parents informed
of their conduct. It was admitted that there was no employee
of the company on the end car, and that the engineman and conductor did not know of the accident till some time after it happened.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Bow E, C. J.-These are cross-appeals in an action instituted
under the 1st and 2d sections of Article 65 of the Code, by the
state for the use of a widowed mother, whose son was killed under
the circumstances detailed in the bill of exceptions.
After evidence was offered by both parties, a series of prayers
was submitted by each, all of which were rejected and other
instructions given by the court instead thereof.
To which rejection, and the instructions given, the plaintiffs and
defendants seveially excepted.
The counsel of the defendants having filed in these causes a
declaration in writing, that, in the event of an affirmance of the
judgment as against the plaintif on their appeal in the first case,
the defendants will abandon their exceptions, it is proper first to
inquire whether the appellfts have been aggrieved by the action
of the court below.
The General Assembly of this state in the year 1852, finding
the common-law maxim, "Personal actions die with the person,"
unsuited to the circumstances and condition of the people, enacted
a law entitled "'An act to compensate the families of persons
killed by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another person."
To rhake its design more obvious, the fourth section provides,
"the word person shall apply to bodies politic and corporate,"
and " all corporations shall be responsible, under this act, for the
wrongful acts, neglect, or default of all agents employed by
them."
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The material provisions of this act, as well as its title, are
derived from the 9th and 10th Victoria, and are embodied in Art.
65 (tit. Negligence) of the code.
. The object of the several series of prayers was: 1st. To furnish the jury with a standard of the care and diligence, required
by law of the defendants, to exempt them from liability for damages for the injury incurred ; 2d. To prescribe the care necessary
to be exercised by the deceased to entitle his next of kin to recover; 3d. To define the measure of damages.
The appellant's first prayer required the defendants, under the
circumstances therein predicated, "to exercise the utmost care
and .diligence to prevent accidents endangering the life or lives
of the people or inhabitants of the said city."
The second held, that the defendants were bound to use all the
means and measures of precaution that, the 'highest .prudence
would suggest, and which it was in their power to employ, and if
the use of a guard, or look-out, at the head or in the rear of said
cars * * * was a measure by which such accidents would
probably be avoided, the omission was culpable negligence.
The appqllant's third prayer affirms that the jury, in the estimate of damages, should take into consideration the expense to
which the plaintiff was subjected in consequence of the accident,
and the loss resulting therefrom, not only to the present time, but
also the probable prospective loss and expense, &c., and that, in
estimating the said loss and damage, the jury are not limited to
the actual pecuniary loss proved in said ease.
The propositions laid down by the court, in the first instruction
granted, are That the defendants, in the movement and management of their
cars and engines, were bound to exercise the utmost care and
diligence which it was within their means and power to employ,
to prevent accidents, and injuring or endangering the life or lives
of the people; and if the jury find that the child of the plaintiff's
eestui que. use was run over and killed by the defendants' cars,
as described by the witnesses, and that, if the defendants, in the
use and management of their cars and engines, had exercised the
highest degree of care and diligence 1 which it was within their
means and power to employ," the said accident could have been
prevented, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover in the action;
but although the jury may find that the said accident could have
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been prevented by the use of such care and diligence on the part
of the defendants, yet the plaintiff is not entitled to recover if the
jury believe the accident could have been avoided by the exercise of that degree of care, by the said child, which was, under
all the circumstances, to be naturally and reasonably expected
from one of said boy's age and intelligence.
The degree of care and diligence imposed by law on the defendants, in the instruction given by the court, is as high as that
required by the appellant's prayers; the degree is the 11utmost
care and diligence," the " highest it was within their means and
power to employ ;" the only material difference is, that one of the
appellant's prayers asked- the court to instruct the jury specifically, "1that if the use of a guard or look-out, at the head or in
the rear of said .cars, was a measure by which such accidents
would probably be avoided, the omission was culpable negligence."
The general terms used by the court embraced all the particulars
specified by the prayer of the appellant, qualified by the words,
"it was within their means and power to employ."
The jury were at liberty to find, under the instruction given,
and perhaps dil find, that the absence of the guard. constituted
the want of the " highest care and diligence within the means and
power of the defendants," and therefore rendered their verdict in
favor of the plaintiff.
The liability of the defendants ii this case did not depend upon
their obligations as carriers of passengers, in which character they
are bound " to use the utmost care and diligence which human
foresight can use :" Stockton v. Frey, 4 G. 422-23.; TFortliington
v. Baltimore and 0hio Railroad Co. (in this court, not yet
reported). But their liability, if any, arises upon a statute which
limits the action to such wrongful act, neglect, or default, "as
would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured
to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof:"
Vide Code, art. 65, § 1.
The party injured not being a'passenger, the defendants were
not required to exercise that degree of vigilance which the law
required towards those with whom there is a relation of trust and
confidence, or bailment between the parties. 1 Towards the one,
the liability of the latter springs from a contract express or
implied, and upheld by an adequate consideration. Towards the
other, he is under no obligation but that of justice and humanity.
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While engaged in their lawful business, both are bound to use a
degree of caution suited to the exigencies of the case :" 8
Barb. 378.
In an analogous case, this court said: Railroad companies should
use "1such care and diligence in using the locomotive upon the
road, as would be exercised by skilful, prudent, and discreet persons, having the control and management of the engine, regarding
their duty to the company, the demands of the public, and the
interests of those having property, and having a proper desire to
avoid injuring property along the road." This was said in a case
of injury to property, but is cited -with approbation by Redfield
as applicable to persons: Redfield on Railways 845, 4 Ald. 257.
The court's instruction did not close with the definition of the
degree of care and diligence on the part of defendants; but proceeded to inform the jury, although the accident could have been
prevented by the exercise of such care and - diligence by the
defendants, yet the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, if the jury
believe the accident could have been avoided by the exercise of
such care by the child as might, under all the circumstances,
have been reasonably expected from one of his age and'intelli
gence. In other words, if there was neglect or default on the
part of the boy, or the absence of that prudence which boys of
like age and capacity usually exhibit, the defendants were not
liable, although, by the exercise of extraordinary care on their
part, the accident might have been prevented.
This ruling is in conformity with all the text-writers, and the
great majority of adjudged cases: Redfield on Railways 387 ; 2
Car. & R. 730; 8 C. B. 115.
It is objected on the part of the plaintiff below, the appellant in
this case, that the court's first instruction was erroneous, in instructing the jury, the action could hot be maintained "1if the jury
believed the accident could have been avoided by the exercise of
that degree of care by the said child, which was, under all the
circumstances, to be naturally and reasonably expected from one
of his age and intelligence." Whereas the court should have told'
the jury the plaintiffs could not recover, if the jury found "there
was a want of that degree of care on the part of the said child
which, under the circumstances, was naturally and reasonably to
be expected in one of his age and intelligence." The question
of the "want of," or absence of such care, should have been left
VOL. XIV.=-26
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to the jury rather than the exercise of such care. It is difficult,
if not impossible, to perceive the difference between the two propositions. In the court's instructions the proposition is stated
affirmatively; in the appellant's objection it is negatively. The
jury were to find whether there was or was not due care on the
part of the deceased. They are told by the court, "if they
believed the accident could have been avoided by the exercise of
that degree of care," &c., the plaintiff could not recover. The
appellant insists that, not the exercise, but the want of care (which
is the non-exercise of care), is the criterion. The principle of the
common law, that a plaintiff cannot recover for injuries to which
his own negligence directly contributed, is admitted, and it seems
to us it was clearly expressed by the court in the instruction
given, as far as the conduct of the deceased child was concerned.
In the case of The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Lamborn,
12 Md. 261, and Keech's Case, 17 Id. 46, the rule of the common
law, that the plaintiff could not recover for injuries to which his
own negligence directly contributed, was held to apply to actions
brought on the statutes therein referred to, and the instructions,
affirmed by the court in those cases, submitted to the jury the
question of negligence on the part of the plaintiff, es well as on
the part of the defendant.
The same policy would require the plaintiff to show, in actions
for injuries resulting in death, that neither the party injured, nor
the parties for whose use the action was brought, had contributed',
by neglect or want of care, to the calamity complained of. This
omission in the instruction given enured to the advantage of the
appellant, and cannot be taken advantage of on her appeal.
The objection raised by the plaintiff to the court's second
instruction, involves the measure of damages. In the language
of the brief, "it was erroneouS, 1st. Because it ignores the mental
sufferings of the mother suing for damages sustained by the loss
of the child, and confines her claim to pecuniary damages." 2d.
Because it limits the pecuniary loss of the mother, the cestui que
use, "to the minority of the child, and deprives the jury of the
right to award her damages for the pecuniary loss she would
reasonably sustain, in her advanced life, for want of the labor and
services of.the son, even after he reached his majority. The rule
should have been to allow what they considered a reasonable
compensation."
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In the absence of any interpretation of this act by our own
courts, we must compare and weigh the reasoning of the authorities cited, in which similar acts have been construed by other
tribunals.
First in order are the decisions in England upon the act called
Lord Campbell's Act, 1 Redfield 836. The observations of CoLERIDGE, J., in the case of Blake, Adm'r., v. The Iffidland Bail
wayi, 10 Eng. L. & E. R. 487, cited by Redfield in his notes, are
very strong in support of the instructions given by the court below
in this case, confining the jury to the pecuniary damage sustained
by the plaintiff. He says: " Our only safe course is to look at
the language the legislaturie has employed. The title of the act
is for compensating families of persons, &c., not for solacing their
wounded feelings." * * * By the terms of the act, quoting
the second section, "the measure of damages is not the loss or
suffering of the deceased, but the injury, resulting from his death,
to his family." This language seems more appropriate to a loss
of which some estimate may be made, than an indefinite sum,
independent of all pecuniary estimate, to soothe the feelings, and
the division of the amount strongly tends to the same conclusion.
As we have before intimated, the title and language of the Act
of Assembly of this state are almost literally the same with those
of the English statute.
The former contains, also, the -provisions for distributing the
damages among the surviving members of the deceased family,
on which the l;arned judge relies for adopting the principle of
compensation for damages which may be estimated in money.
The American cases, arising upon acts varying in language,
necessarily lead, as observed by Judge Redfield, to a diversity
of decisions. We have no better guide than the construction of a.
statute originating in the same policy, and expressed in the same
words by enlightened jurists, distinguished for their independence
and jealous regard for the rights of suitors.
It is assumed by the learned author just mentioned, as the conclusion of the best considered cases in this country, that mental
anguish, ' which is the natural result of the injury, may be taken
into the estimate of the damages to the party injured.
The connection in which this assumption is made, might lead to
the inference that it applied to actions brought by survivors, for
injuries done to their deceased ancestor, relative, or next of kin
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but upon refbrence to the muthoriti(es cited, it will be found that
the plaintifs in those cases were the persons sustaining the bodily
harmn, and in estimating their damages their mental suffering
constituted an element of compensation: 1 Cush. 451 ; 10 Barb.
623.
To have instructed the jury to allow "what they considered a
reasonalble compensation," would, in the language of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, "be giving the jury discretionary power,
without stint or limit, highly dangerous to the rights of the d;fondant, and leaving them -without any rule whatever :" Rose v.
Story, 1 Barr 190, 197. In the case of the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Kelly, 7 Casey 372, the same learned court say:
"Generally speaking, the influence of the court, in this class
of cases, should be exerted to restrain those excesses into which
juries are apt to run. * * * Wild verdicts are frequently
rendered. And the tendency, in modern times, undoubtedly is
to excessive damages, especially where they are to be assessed
against corporations :" Ibid. 379; The Pennsylvania Railroad
Go. v. Zebe et uz., 33 Penna. 330.
The last objection to the second instruction granted, is that it
limits the mother to compensation for loss of her son during his
minority only.
To submit to a jury the value of a life, without limit as to years,
would have been to leave them to speculate upon its duration
without any basis of calculation.
The law entitles the mother to the services of her child, during
his minority only {the father being dead) ; beyond this, the chances
of survivorship, his ability or willingness to support her, are matters of conjecture too vague to enter in'to an estimate of damages
merely compensatory. According to the appellant's theory, the
mother bnd son are supposed to live on together to an indefinite
age the one craving for sympathy and support, the other rendering reverence, obedience, and 'protection. Such pictures of
filial piety are inestimable moral examples, beautiful to contemplate, but the law has no standard by which to measure their
loss.
This court, being of opinion that the several instructions granted
by the court below were as favorable to the plaintiff (the appellant)
as she was entitled to, and that she was not prejudiced by the
rejection of the prayers submitted on her part, finds no error in
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the rulings of the court below, in the first appeal, and will affirm
the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
The first proposition maintained in
this case is very obvious upon principle
as well as the decided cases. Where such
an amount of passenger traffic as is now
done by railways is confided to agents
operating by means of so powerful and
dangerous an element as steam, no state
or country could fairly justify any rule
of responsibility except that of the utmost practicable watchfplness, skill, and
ability. , And no doubt these considerations, connected with the nature and
extent of the business of railways, will
justify a demand that their business
shall be so conducted as to give fair and
just opportunity for the conduct of other
legitimate business, more or less interfering with that of tho company,' with
reasonable security The rule, as stated
in some of the earlier cases, in regard to
railways, is that they should be so conducted, with reference to other business
interests, that all may have proper scope
and reasonable opportunity to escape
detriment; the same as if tho company
owned both interests, and desired the
success of both: Quimby v. lermont Central Railway. Co., 23 Vt. Rep. 387.
This rule, as we have often attempted
to show, will apply with great strinkency to any business which is more than
commonly liable to destroy life or property. Prudent men always nieasure
their care and diligence by the exigencies
of the business and the occasion. Hence
it was held in an early case in California ( Wilson v. Cunninghzam, 3 Cal. Rep.
241), that where the track of a railway
intersects the thoroughfares of a city the
company are bound to exercise extraordinary care not to injure persons in the
streets.
Accordingly, in the present case, it is
probably true, as suggested by the court,

that where a company push a train of cars
backwards through the streets of a city,
they w6uld be bound to have a servant
so stationed that he could look out for
persons or property exposed to injury,
and who could either himself stop the
train or give signal to some one for that
purpose in time to prevent collision and
damage. But this is not a question of
law altogether, and would ordinarily
have to be passed upon by the jury. We
have discussed this general question of
diligence and negligence, both as to the
principles involved and the dases bearing
upon it, in Taylor v. Briggs, 28 Vt.
Rep. 180, more in detail than would be
proper here.
In regard to the effect of general negligence in the party to whom the injury
ocurs, remotely exposing him to the
injury, but forming no part of the proximate cause of the same, the cases are
numerous, and at the present day reasonably concurrent in the result, that unless
the want of due care on the part of the
party injured or of those responsible for
the conduct of such party contributed
directly to the production of the injury,
the other party will be responsible, provided his negligence was the efficient'
cause of the injury and, with the exercise of proper care, he might have
avoided inflicting it, notwithstanding
the general want of proper watchfulness
by the party injured. The cases are
too numerous upon this point to be
quoted in detail. Davies v. Mann, 10
M. & W. 546 ; lidge v. Goodwin, 5 C.
& P. 190, are the leading English cases.
The American cases will be found, in
almost all the states, to have maintained
the same view. Trow v. Vermont Central Railway Co., 24 Vt. Rep. 487; Isbell v. N. Y. 4- N. H. R. R. Co, 2
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Conn. Rep. 393; Kerwhackerv. C. C. 4C. R. R. Co., 3 Ohio (N. S.) 172;
C. C. 4- C. B. B. Co. v. Elliott, 4 Id.
474. The fule is very broadly stated in
New Haven Steamboat 6- Transportation
76. v. anderbilt, 16 Conn. Rep. 421.
And it seems that the fact that the
person or property, as cattle, are trespassing at the time the injury occurs will
not subject them to damage without redress, provided there is no such wrong
on the part of the person, or of the ofrner
of the property, as to contribute directly
to the injury, so that the other party
might not, with ordinary care, have
avoided it : Isbdl v. N. Y. J- N. H. R.
R. Co., supra ; Daley v. Norwich 4.
Worcester B. R. Co., 26 Conn. Rep.
591 ; Brown v. Lynn, 31 Penn. St. Rep.
510; C. C. 6- C. BR.R. Co. v. Terry, 8
Ohio (N. S.) 570.
But where the negligence ofthe party
injured, in any manner or to any extent,
contributed directly to the production of
the injury, however slightly, there can
be no recovery: Witherly v. Regent's
Canal Company, 12 C. B. N. S. 2; s. c.
3 F. &F. 61. So in averylate English case, where the party finding the
gates at a crossing negligently closed in
the night time, after every exertion to
find some servant of the company to open
them, necessarily opened the gates himself in order to pursue his journey, and
where, without any fault on his part,
the gate swung back by its own weight
and struck the horse which became unmanageable, whereby the plaintiff was
thrown out of the carriage and injured,
it was held he could not recover, inasmuch as he had no right to open the
gates himself, and the injury was produced by his own wrongful act in doing
so: WTyatt v. Great WFestern Railway
Co., 11 Jur. (N. S.) 825.
The question of damages is* one in
regard to which, for a time, the cases
seemed to v.Cillate somewhat, upon the

point whether the manner of the intfiction of the injury and the shock to the
feelings of those near relatives for whose
benefit the action was brought, could be
taken into the account. It seems very
clear that where the suit is for the benefit
of the very person sustaining the injury.
there could be no question that any
shock or injury to his feelings, any mental suffering, which was the direct consequence of the injury, should be considered in estimating damages. Such
suffering is a part of the necessary labor
to be borne by the party injured, in
consequence of the injury: Canning v.
WIlliamstown, 1 Cash. 451 ; Morse v.
Auburn 4. Syr. Railway Co., 10 Barb
621. But in estimating damages to
other parties, affected incidentally by the
death of the party injured, it seems now
prettygenerally conceded, that no account
of wounded feelings can be taken. And
this, upon the whole, seems but just and
reasonable. For there would be no uniformity in cases of this kind if the jury
were allowed to go into considerations
so remote and uncertain: Penn. Railway
Co. v. McCloskey, 23 Penn. St. Rep.
526, 528, where it is aid, "The jury
must place a money value -upon the life
of a fellow-being, very much as they
would upon his health or reputation."
And the same rule is followed in Oakland Railway Co. v. Rdding, 48 Penn.
St. Rep. 320. So in North Penn. Railroad Co. v. Robinson, 44 Penn. St. Rep.
175, it is said, the value of the life
lost, estimated by a pecuniary standard,
is what is to be recovered.
There is one qualification in regard to
the extent to which damages were allowed to be given by the jury in the
principal case, which has not generally
been adverted to, and which seems to us
somewhat liable to misconstruction. We
refer to the restriction limiting prospective damages to the minority of the child.
It has been decided that a father may re-
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(:oTer pecuniary damages for the death of
a son twenty-seven years of age, unmaried, and who had been accustomed to
make occasional presents to his parents :
Dalton v. South Eastern Railway Co.,
4 C. B. N. S. 296. And it was here
held, as it has often been in other
cases, that the jury could not give damages by way of compensating the father
for the expenses of his son's funeral or
for procuring family mourning. SoDlso
Franklin v. South Eastern Railway Co.,
3 H. & N. 211 ; Blake v. MidlandRailway Co., 18 Q.B. 93. Itwaslatelyheld
in the Exchequer Chafhber (Pymv. Great
Northern Railway Co., 10 Jur., N. S.
199) that where, in consequence of the

death of the father, his income was by
direction of his will unequally distributed
among his widow and children, the eldest son taking most of it, that damages
might be recovered for the benefit of the
whole class on that ground, some of the
children being thereby deprived of an
expected support had the life of the father
continued. In the very late English
case of Boater v. Webster, 13 W. R.
289, the Cotfrt of Queen's Bench adhered to the rule that no damages could
be awarded to the parent by reason of
the death of his child, on account of the
expenses of the funeral.
I. F. R.

Court of Common Pleas of New York.
NEW YORK, ALBANY, AND BUFFALO TELEGRAPH COMPANY e.
DE RUTTE.
Where a telegraph company receives a message addressed to a place beyond its
route; and takes the compensation for the entire distance, it engages for the due
delivery of the message at its destination, unless it expressly limits its responsibility
to its own route, or the circumstances are such as to clearly indicate that such was
the understanding of the contracting parties.
The receiver of the message is entitled to sue for his loss by the company's
negligence.
The same general principles apply to the liabilities of telegraph companies as to
common carriers, but not invariably nor to the same extent. Per DALY, J.
A telegraph company has a right to limit its liability by requiring a message to
be repeated, but knowledge of this requirement must be brought home to the
sender.
Where a person received a telegram in which there were several errors, all but
one of which, however, he interpreted correctly, and that one was not apparent on
its face, it is not such negligence in him not to have the message repeated, as will
prevent his recovery for loss incuried in consequence of the undiscovered error.
Where a party receiving a telegram erroneously directing him to purchase wheat
at 25 francs instead of 22 francs as the message should have been, purchases a
quantity of wheat which he is obliged to resell at a lower price, the loss is such a
direct result of the negligence as will entitle him to recover.
The Act of 1848 in regard to telegraph companies and messages, is intended as
much for the protection of the companies against combinations and monopolies among
themselves, as for the public. Per DALY, J.
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Tis was an action brought against the appellants, defendants
below, for damages for the incorrect transmission of a message
sent from New York by their line to the plaintiff in San Fran
cisco.

The facts were as follows:The plaintiff below was a commission berchant doing business
in San Francisco, California. He had a brother, Theophilus De
Rutte, who was his agent and correspondent at Bordeaux in
France, but who had otherwise no interest in the plaintiff's business. T. De Rutte procured from Callarden & Labourdette,
bankers in Bordeaux, an order for the plaintiff to purchase for
them a cargo of wheat in California, at- the extreme limit of
twenty-two francs the hectolitre, which is the French official
measure for grain. The plaintiff was to purchase and ship the
grain to Callarden & Labourddtte immediately, his commission
and the mode of his reimbursement to be the same as in a previous
order which he had received from another Bordeaux firm, one of
the partners in which was named Monod. Upon receiving the
order, Theophilus De Rutte prepared a telegram in these words:
" Edward De Rutte, San Francisco, buy for Callarden & Labourdette, bankers, a shipload of five to six hundred tons vhite wheat,
first quality, extreme limit twenty-two francs the hectolitre landed
at Bordeaux, same conditions as the Monod contract, T. BE
RUTTE:" and inclosed it in a letter to Jules Lorrimer, a merchant
of New York, with instructions to send it to the plaintiff in the
quickest manner, and to debit the plaintiff with the charges.. A
clerk of Lorrimer copied the message upon a slip of paper and
took it to the telegraph office of the defendant, where he gave it to
a clerk to whom he paid $21.50 for its transmission to San Francisco. The defendants have printed blanks in their office upon
which messages are written containing a notice, that to guard
against mistakes, every message of importance ought to be
repeated, for which half the 'price will be charged; and that they
will not be responsible for mistakes or delays in the transmission
of unropeated messages from whatever cause they may arise. It
did not appear that any such blanks were used in this case, nor
was it shown that Lorrimer's clerk or his principal knew of the
regulation.

The defendant's line extends from New York to Buffalo, where
it connects with other lines, and a pony express to San Francisco
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The message was transmitted correctly by the defendant's line,
and by the connecting lines to St. Louis, but when delivered to
the plaintiff at San Francisco there were several errors. Th. De
Rutte was changed to TFo8. fDe Rutte, Monod contract to monied
contract, hectolitre to pretorlitiere,and twenty-two to twenty-five
francs.
The plaintiff was not miesled as to three of the alterations. He
understood the abbreviation Thos. to mean Theophilus, the words
monied contract to mean Monod contract, and pretorlitiere to mean
hectolitre. The words twenty-five francs, however, he assumed to
be correct, but before acting upon the message, he tried, as he
said, to get a copy of the despatch from the telegraph company at
San Francisco, but they stated that they could not furnish it.
Grain could be purchased in San Francisco at that time, at a price
which would admit of its being landed at Bordeaux., charges
included, at twenty-four to twenty-five francs the hectolitre, but
not at twenty-two, and the plaintiff accordingly purchased the
requisite quantity, and chartered a vessel for its shipment to Bordeaux, when he received from New York, twenty days after the
despatch, the letter which his brother had written, advising himthat the extreme limit was twenty-two instead of twenty-five francs.
As a further assurance, on receiving this letter, he had the despatch repeated, after which he sold the wheat at the cost price,
less commission, storage, and interest, and after several days'
effort, he succeeded in getting rid of the charter-party by the
payment of $1600 in gold, and he paid the wharfage of the vessel,
and the brokerage fees upon the recharter, making in all, with
the commissions, storage, and interdst, the sum of $2094.51, for
which the plaintiff recovered judgment.
From this judgment defendant appealed.
T. ff. Rodman, for appellant.
Ed. Bandolph Bobinson, for appellee.
The opiiion of the court was delivered by
DALY, J.-We are asked to reverse this judgment upon several
grounds. The first ground taken by the defendant is, that their
contract was to transmit the despatch from New York to Buffalo,
and deliver it there to the connecting line, which they did. That
it is made their duty by Statute Laws of New York for 1848,
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page 395, § 11, to receive- messages from and for other telegraph
lines, and that where they transmit and deliver a message correctly to a connecting line, they are not answerable for errors
occurring.afterward.
The duty which the 9tatute imposes is as much for the benefit
of the telegraph companies as for the individuals wjo make use
of them, for the business of a company, where there'are several
cQnnecting lines, might be materially diminished if any of them
should refuse to deliver messages to or receive them from it, and
the object of this provision, therefore, was manifestly to enable
new companies to compete with established lines, thus preventing
the evils of monopolies, and of combinations among companies.
But while the statute makes it the duty of a telegraph company
to receive and transmit such inessages, it does not make it in such
a case the collecting agent of the other lines. It imposes no
higher duty than the words express, and leaves each company at
*liberty to require the payment of its own charges before it either
delivers or transmits a message. Where a message is to be transmitted through many connecting lines, it is a matter of conve*nience to be enabled to pay the entire charge, either at the place
from which it is sent, or at the place where it is received; and it
is the interest of companies, especially where there are competing
lines, to make arrangements whereby upon the payment to them
of the whole charge, a message may be sent the entire length of
telegraphic communication. It is to be assumed that this is
the case, when a telegraphic company was paid for the transmission
of a message to a place beyond their own lines, with which they
are in communication by the agency of other companies, and they
must in such a case be regarded as undertaking that the message
will be transmitted and delivered at that place.
The same rule must be applied to them that is applied to a common carrier, who receives the whole compensation for the carriage
of a package addressed to a place beyond the limits of his own
route; that is, that he engages for the due delivery of the package
at the place of destination, unless he expressly limits his responsibility to his own route, or the circumstances are such as to clearly
indicate that that was the understanding of the contracting parties: Weed v. The Schenectady and Saratoga Bailroad, 19
Wend. 584; Muschamp v. The Lancaster and Preston Railway
Co., 8 M. & W. 421; St. John v. Van Santvoord, 25 Wend
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660 ; Id., 6 Hill 157, in error; Wilcox v. _Parmlee, 8 Sandf. S.
C. Rep. 610. By taking pay in advance for the whole distance,
he holds himself out as a carrier for the entire distance, per
WALWORTH, C., -in Van Santvoord v. St. John, sitpra, where a

railroad that terminated in Boston took a wagon at Troy, that was
to be carried to Burlington. Hence, it is said, "It was no part of
the plaintiff's business to inquire how many different corporations
made up the entire line of road between Troy and Burlington, or
having ascertained it, to determine at his peril which of such corporations had been guilty of the negligence :" Foy v. Te Troy
and Boston Railroad Co., 24 Barb. 882, and Lord ABINGER in
Huschamp v. The Lancaster, &-c., Railway, supra, remarked,
that it was useful and reasonable for the benefit of the public in
such a case, that it should be considered that the undertaking was
to carry the parcel the whole way. " It is better,' he said, "that
those who undertake the carriage of parcels for their mutual benefit should arrange matters of this kind inter se, and should be
taken each to have made the others their agents ;" all of which
remarks are as applicable to the transmission of a message as to
the carriage of a parcel. In this case Lecdhr told the defendant's
clerk to send the message to California, and asked him what would
be the charge of sending it to San Francisco, to which the clerk
answered 21.50, which Lecoui paid, and this primd facie was
sufficient to show that the defendants engaged to send it to San
Francisco. Whatever contract was made was made with them,
and not with any other company. There was nothing said, nor
was there anything to indicate that they were to be answerable
only for its correct transmission along their own line. They
received the whole amount that was asked to send it to San Francisco, without communicating by what lines it would be sent, or
any other particulars as to the mode or manner of its transmission.
They took upon themselves the whole charge of sending it, and
what arrangements were made, or what sum would be paid for the
use of the lines in connection with them, were matters not disclosed to the party interested in the transmission of the message,
and with which consequently he had nothing to do. He made his
contract with them, and if injured by its non-fulfilment, he has a
right to look to them for compensation for the injury sustained.
The next objection taken by the defendants is, that they entered
into no contract with the plaintiff; that they made their contract with
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Th. De.Rutte, who sent the message, acting as the agent of Callardan & Libourdette. It does not necessarily follow that the
contract is made with the person by whom, or in whose name, a
message is sent. He may have no interest in the subject-matter
of the message, but the party to whom it is addressed may be the
only one interested in its correct or diligent transmission, and
where that is the case he is the one in reality with whom the contract is made. The business of transmitting messages by means
of the electric telegraph is like that of common carriers in the
nature of a public employment, for those who engage in it do not
undertake to transmit messages only for particular persons, but
for the public generally. They hold out to the public that they
are ready and willing to transmit intelligence for any one upon
the payment of their charges, and when paid for sending it, it
forms no part of their business to inquire who is interested in, or
who is to be benefited by the intelligence conveyed. That becomes
material only where there has been a delay or a mistake in the
transmission of a message which has been productive of injury or
damage to the person by whom or for whom they were employed,
and to that person thel are responsible, whether he was the one
who sent, or the one who was to receive the message. It is somewhat analogous to the question which arises, when goods are lost
upon their carriage, whether the action against the carrier is to
be brought by the consignor or the consignee, and the general
rule upon the subject is that the one in whom the legal right to
the property is vested, is the one to bring 'the action, and if that
is the consignee, the consignor, in making the contract with the
carrier, is regarded as having acted as the agent of the othbr:
Danes v. Peck, 8 T. R. 830; Griffith v. Ingledew, 6 Serg.
Rawle 429; Freeman v. Birch, 1 Nev. & Man. 420; Dutton v.
Solomson, 3 Bos. & Pull. 584 ; -Everettv. Salters, 15 Wend. 474.
In the case now before us it could make no difference to Callardan
& Labourdette whether the message was correctly transmitted or
not, as wheat could not be purchased at the time in San Francisco
at the price which they had fixed, and the plaintiff was the only
one who could be and who was affected injuriously by the mistake
in the message. The error made led him into the purchase of
over $17,@00 worth of wheat, upon which he expected, upon the
assumption that the despatch was correct, to make his ordinary
commissions, and the purchase proving unavailable when the mis-
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take was discovered, he was subjected to an actual loss of more
than two thousand dollars.
Th. De Rutte may, for certain purposes, be regarded as the
agent of Callardan & Labourdette in giving the order, but he was
more especially the agent of the plaintiff in procuring it for him,
and it is a decisive circumstance to show that he was acting for
the plaintiff, and that the despatch was sent upon his account and
for his benefit that Lorrimer, the corresp6ndent in New York, was
instructed by Theophilus De Rutte to charge the plaintiff with the
expense of transmitting it. It was an order given to a commission
merchant to purchase grain for a foreign house, if it could be
bought at a certain price. In that event he had an interest to"the
extent of his commissions, and that he might have. the earliest
intelligence of it, and secure, if possible, any advantage to be
derived from it, it was by the direction of his agent and corre
spondent at Bordeaux, and at his (the plaintiff's) expense, sent by
telegraph from New York to San Francisco. When the defendants, therefore, undertook and were paid for sending the messages,
their contract was with the plaintiff through his agents, and the
action for the breach of it was properly ?rought by him: -Drybur v. The New Yorc and Washington Telegraph Company, 35
Penn. R. 297 ; -Ey]re v. Higbee, 15 How. 46.
But if we were to leave out of view altogether the question with
whom the contract was made, the defendants would still be liable
to the plaintiff for putting him to loss and damage through their
negligence in transmitting to him an erroneous message, and as
they were the company to whom the whole compensation for its
transmission was paid, they would be liable in an action for negligence, .though the error or mistake was made by one of the companies through whom they transmitted it. It has been frequently
held that the owner of a vessel is liable for a collision resulting
from negligence, though his vessel at tihe time was under the control of a pilot acting under an independent commission from the
state, the reason given for which is, that it is more convenient and
more conformable to the general spirit of the law, that the owner,
who has had the benefit of the voyage, should seek his remedy
against the pilot than that the injured party should be turned over
to an action against the pilot: Yates v. Brown, 8 Pick. 23; 16
Martin's La., 4 Dall. 206 ; l7et1 er v. Broderip, 5 B. & P. 182.
And I think it may be said with equal force where a merchant in
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San Francisco receives a telegraphic message from New York
which leads him into a purchase involving inevitable pecuniary
loss, which would not have occurred but for an error made in the
transmission of the message, that he should not be compelled to
seek, through a chain of telegraphic communication extending
over nearly the whole length and breadth of the United States, to
ascertain where the error or mistake was made, but that it is more
equitable and just to hold that the telegraph company to whom the
message was originally given, and to whom the whole compensation for its transmission was paid, should be answerable to him for
the negligence, and that, having peculiar facilities, the obligation
should be upon them to ascertain when, where, and how the error
occurred, leaving them to fix the ultimate responsibility upon
those to whom it belongs. "Where a trust," said Lord HOLT,
"is put in one person, and another whose interest is intrusted to
him is damnified by the neglect of such as that person employs in
the discharge of that trust, he shall answer for it to the party
damnified: Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 490. A trust was reposed
in the defendants that they would send the message as it was
delivered to them. Tley determined by what companies it should
be sent beyond their line, and as the result has shown, the plaintiff had an interest in its correct transmission, which is sufficient
to bring the case within this rule which Lord HoLT laid down in
an action on the case for negligence, and which, though expressed
in a dissenting opinion, has been uniformly regarded as sound
law.
The next question that arises is as to the nature and exact
extent of the responsibility which the law should impose upon
those who engage in the public business of transmitting intelligence from one place to another by means of the electric telegraph,
whether considered with reference to their liability upon contract,
or for injuries brought about by their negligence. The law upon
this subject is as yet undefined, for the business is of recent
origin, and the cases which have arisen are comparatively few. 1
have already pointed out one distinguishing feature that, though
pursued for reward, it is designed for the general convenience of
the public. Like the business of common carriers, the interests
.of the public are so largely incorporated with it that it differs
from ordinary bailments, which parties are at liberty to enter into
or not, as they please. In this state it is made the duty of tele
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graph companies by statute to transmit despatches from and for
any individuals with impartiality and good faith upon the payment
of their usual charges (Laws of New York, 1848, p. 395), a duty
which would arise from the nature of their business, even if there
were no statute upon the subject. Common carriers are held to
the responsibility of insurers for the safe delivery of the property
intrusted to their care, upon grounds of public policy, to prevent
frauds or collusion with them, and because the owner, having surrendered up the possession of his property, is generally unable to
show how it was lost or injured: Riley v. H1ome, 5 Bing. 217;
Thomas v. The Boston and -ProvidenceRailroad Corporation,10
Met. (Mass.) 476; Coggs v. Bernard, I Ld. Ray. 909 and App.
These reasons, which are the ones usually assigned for the extraordinary responsibility of common carriers, cannot be regarded as
applicable to the same extent to telegraph companies, nor are
there any reasons, in my judgment, why they should be held to
the extent of the responsibility of insurers for the correct trans.
mission and delivery of intelligence. As their business, however,
is one which leads to their being intrusted with confidential and
valuable information, especially in commercial matters, there are
opportunities for frauds and abuses, which, in view of the relation
that they occupy to the public, makes it necessary upon grounds
of public policy that they should be held to a more strict accountability than ordinary bailees. As the value of their service
consists in the message intrusted to them being correctly and
diligently transmitted, it must be taken for granted that they
engage to do so, and if there is an unreasonable delay or an error
committed, it should be presumed that it has arisen from their
negligence, unless they can show that it occurred from causes
beyond their control. It is particularly suggested by the counsel
of the defendants that the telegraph is not at all times subject to
the will of the operator. That although the machinery and apparatus are in .complete order, yet at times a message cannot be sent
because of supervening influences which at some point on the line,
unknown to the operator, destroy the affinity or other active
qualities of the current as it passes along the wire. The delicate
touch of the battery may start the fluid .which, by its passage, is
to transmit the agreed sign, but before it reaches its destination a
surchar-ged atmosphere, hundreds of miles away from the operator,
may utterly destroy or materially vary the tractability of the
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conductor. The fluid must thus be diffused or varied in its practical
operation, without the power of man to foresee or to prevent it.
Those who avail themselves of the advantage of the telegraph, can
expect nothing more than it is in the power of this novel and
useful invention to afford. Causes like this, or any cause equally
satisfactory, would absolve a telegraph company from all responsibility for errors or delays. It is inevitable, moreover, that mistakes should be committed even by the most skilful persons in the
interpreting, transmitting, and the transcribing of words, and
where the liability to do so is manifest, and the risk incurred is
great, it is reasonable that telegraph companies should have the
right to require as a test for their own security against loss, that
a message should be repeated. Their compensation is small in
proportion to the risks they incur, and they have the right to
qualify their liability by'a special contract that they will not be
answerable unless that condition is complied with. Like common
carriers, they may limit their liability by a special acceptance
when the message is delivered to them, but which must be brought
home to the knowledge of those who employ them, who might
otherwise be ignorant of the fact that a repetition of the message
was necessary to insure its accurate transmission. It may be that
in the course of time this practice will become so universally
established among telegraph companies, that all doing business
with them will be presumed to have a knowledge of it, and that the
omission to secure a repetition of a message will be at the risk and
peril of the party for whom it is sent.
That is not the case at present, and as there was nothing on the
trial of this action to show that the clerk who delivered the message, or any one interested in it, knew of the establishment of such
a regulation by the defendants, the ground of defence is not avail.
able to them.
The next ground taken is, that the plaintiff was himself at fault,
in not having the message repeated, after he had ascertained that
there were three errors in it. That it was co-operating negligence
on his part to act upon such a message, which deprives him of all
right of action. He went to the officer in San Francisco to ascer.
tain exactly what despatch they had received, but they could not
find it, and I think that the errors he had discovered were not of
a character which should have led him to doubt if the words
twenty-five were correct. The change from Th. to Thos. was a
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very natural one. The mistake in a French word was one that
might ordinarily occur, and the transformation of Monod, to the
operator an unmeaning word, into monied, was one of those slips
or mistakes which might readily be made. That they were so is
apparent in the fact that he at once discovered them, and I think
that it does not follow because he discovered mistakes like these
that he was bound to regard the whole message as unreliable, and
have it repeated at an expense of some fifty dollars. The words
twenty-five were intelligible and plain. They expressed the very
price at which wheat was then ranging in San Francisco, and it
was very natural for him to suppose that they bad been transmitted
correctly. To hold that he was guilty of negligence because he
assumed that the message was correct in this particular, would be
to declare that no man must act upon one in which he discovers a
few trivial mistakes, but which is otheriise perfectly intelligible,
except at his peril. I do not profess to have much information
upon the subject, but I apprehend that it is a matter of common
and every-day experience for messages to be received with words
misspelt or otherwise altered, without affecting their general sense,
but with which they are perfectly intelligible, which the party
receiving would have to disregard or get repeated to be made
secure in acting upon them, if the courts were to recognise such a
rule as the defendants insist upon.
The last question in this case relates to the measure of damages.
The defendants claim that the loss which the plaintiffs sustained
in consequence of this erroneous message, was not one that can be
regarded as fairly within the contemplation of the parties, or such
as would naturally be expected to flow from the mistake that was
made.
I dissented from the judgment of my brethren in Bryant v.
The American Telegraph Co., decided at the General Term 1866,
in which they held a telegraph company responsible to the amount
of $10,000 for a delay in the delivery of a telegraphic despatch,
by which the plaintiff lost the opportunity of securing a debt of
that amount by an attachment upon property of the value, belonging to his debtor; and so far as this court is concerned, that case
is decisive of the point now presented. But this is a much
stronger case than that. The order, erroneously transmitted by
the defendant's instrumentality to the plaintiff, was the direct
cause of his purchasing the wheat at the price which le did, and
VOL. XIV.-27

TELEGRAPH CO. v. DE RUTTE.

of the outlay he made for its shipment, and the inevitable loss
which resulted from his acting upon the supposed order, was the
natural and necessary consequence of that purchase. The familiar
rule in respect to damages, is that they must be such as flow
directly and naturally from the non-fulfilment of the contract;
that they must not be the remote, but the proximate consequences
of the breach; that they must be certain, and not speculative or
contingent; and where the right of action is founded solely upon
the ground of negligence, irrespective of any questions of contract,
that they must be the direct and immediate consequence of the
negligence committed, and this case comes fully within this rule.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Of the several points presented in the
foregoing opinion, we shall notice two,
as bearing more directly upon the law
of telegraphs and treating the subject in
a clear and forcible manner.
I. As to the nature and extent of the
responsibility which the law should impose upon those who engage in the business of transmitting intelligence for the
public by means of the electric telegraph.
There have been so few decisions upon
this subject, and the law on the cases
which have arisen, is as yet so meagre,
that it is incapable of being predicated
with any certainty, and in fact is only
reached at all by analogy. The nature
of the business differs essentially in
many particulars from that of the common carrier, and although the same
general rules are said to be applicable
to both, they must -ndergo considerable
modification or they fail to render impartial justice. In Parks v. The Alta
Cal. Co., 13 Cal. 422, B.ALDwix, J.,
says: "The rules of law which govern
the liabilities of telegraph companies
are not new. They are old rules applied
to new circumstances. There is no
difference in the general nature of the
legal obligation of the contract between
-carrying a message along a wire and
carrying goods or a package along a
route. In both cases the responsibility

of the parties for breach of duties is
governed by the same general rules."
One of the principal reasohs why telegraph companies should be held to the
same responsibility attaching to other
common carriers is because the public
are greatly concerned in having those
intrusted with duties so vitally affecting
the commercial interests of a country,
held to a strict accountability-and this,
so far from pressing with undue severity
on them and tending to restrain their
formation, would undoubtedly result to
their advantage, as everything which
tends to lessen their responsibility
weakens their position with the public,
and serves to render them less frequently
the means of communication for commercial transactions requiring the highest possible degree of responsibility.
It was urged, however, in the above
case, and with some apparent justice,
that notwithstanding all the care and
attention that a company may bestow in
the selection of its operators, and their
undoubted competency for the position,
still the telegraph is subject to influences
entirely beyond their control, and not
within the power of human foresight to
guard against; and, therefore, telegraph
companies should not be held to the same
accountability as ordinary common cartiers. The argument, however, fails of
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force because this is the case with every
carrier for hire. There are certain accidents against which he cannot guard and
for which he is not, on that account,
held responsible; and although, with
regard to ordinary carriers, these exceptional cases may be said to be certain,
dnd the public to know exactly what
risks it must bear, still it is only because
the law is definitely settled by the number of decisions upon the subject and the
great length of time common carriers
have been known to the law.
Would it not be better likewise, to hold
telegraph companies strictlyliable to the
same accountability, and allow them in
cases where they have failed to perform
theih contract, to show that it was the
result of an unavoidable accident and
beyond their power to prevent? In a
comparatively short time the cases in
which they would be held unaccountable
would be as well determined as in the
case of other carriers, and the reliance
of the public upon. their responsibility
equally unimpaired.
II. As to how far the original or contracting company, where there are several
connectingalines, should be held accountside for mistakes occurring on such lines,
they not belonging to it nor under its
controL The opinions seem to have
been conflicting at different times and in
different countries. The cases have not
arisen in reference to telegraph companies which are of such recent date,
but of ordinary common carriers, and
here the same rules are undoubtedly
applicable to both. species of carriers,
making allowance for the different causes
which in either case would absolve the
original company from liability.
In a case decided in England in 1841,
Muschamp v. The Laneasterand Preston
Railway Co., 8 M. & W. 421, the plaintiff, a stone-mason, ordered a box of
tools to be sent from Lancaster, a town
on the line of the defendants' railway, to

Wheatsheaf, on a connecting road. The
clerk at the station said the carriage
money had better be paid on delivery.
The box arrived safely at Preston, the
terminus of the defendants' road, but
was afterwards lost, and the question
was whether the defendants were liable.
The Court of Exchequer held that they
were. ABnNGER, C. B., delivering th
opinion, says, "the question is whether
the following is a correct charge to a
jury: Where a common carrier takes
into his care a parcel directed to a particular place, and does not by express
agrement limit his responsibility to part
only of the distance, it is primt facte
evidepuce of an undertaking on his part
to carry the parcel to where it is directed,
although the place is beyond the limits
within which he professes to carry on his
business,"--hdd, that it was. He goes
on to say "that the carriage-money
being one undivided sum, supports the
inference that although the carriers convey the parcel only a part of the distance
in their own vehicles, they make suberdinate contracts with other carriers and
are partners inter se as to the carriagemoney, though particular circumstances
in some cases may rebut the inference
which primd facie must be made that
defendants undertook to carry the parcel
the entire distance." This case goes the
full length of making the original company liable for losses occurring on connecting lines or roads, and was fully
sustained in Scothorn v. The South Staffordshire Railwag Co., 8 Exch. 341,
where ALDEnsoN, B., says "there is no
doubt the defendants agreed to carry the
plaintiff's goods the whole distance for a
certain reward, and there is also no
doubt they are liable for their loss through
negligence during any part of the journey." The goods in this case were lost
on a connecting road, after reaching the
terminus of the defendants' in safety.
In both the foregoing cases the freight
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was paid in one entire sum, but in Uatson could relieve him. This case was rev. The Ambergate and Boston Railway versed in the Exchequer Chamber (1 H.
Co., 3 Eng. L. & E. 497, the carriage- & N. 516), but was sustained in the
money was only paid as far as the termi- House of Lords and the judgment of the
nus of the defendants' road, and the rest Exchequer upheld (5 H. & N. 969),
was to be collected on delivery, yet this the Lord Chancellor, CuEL-mssonn,
was held to make no difference in the saying that the case was governed by
rule, the contract being to carry the 314schamp v. Lancaster Railway.
entire distance: Judge PATTEsoN saying,
There seems to be some conflict among
" the defendants not having taken the the decisions in the different states in this
entire carriage-money is immaterial, and country, very few going quite the extent
may be explained by their not knowing of the English rule, though the majority
thf-. amount."
are strongly inclined that way.
In JSytton v. 3(idland Railway Co.,
In New York, in Weed v. The Sara4 H. & N. 614, it was held that the toga and Schenectady Railroad Co., 19
plaintiff could not recover damages from Wend. 534, the plaintiff contracted with
a connecting railway for a loss occurring the defendants, for the latter to convey
on such connecting line, on the ground a trunk from Saratoga to Albany, a
that there was one contract for an entire place beyond the terminus of their route,
sum with the original company, and no and paid the through fare. It was held,
contract with any of the connecting com- Judge COWEN delivering the opinion of
panies. To the same point are Coxon v. the court, that the defendants were liablo
Great Western Railway Co., 5 H. & N. without proof of the loss occurring on
274, and Blake v. The Same, 7 Id. 986. their road. "The defendants having
The case of Collins v. The Bristol and undertaken to carry from Saratoga tG
Exeter Railway Co., 11 Exch. 790, may Albany, cannot be received to say they
be said to have definitely settled the are carriers no further than Schenectady,
question in England as to the liability the terminus of their route
; they ars
of the original company for all losses on estopped to deny
that they are carriers
connecting roads. The plaintiff, Collins, for a distance
commensurate with what
paid a certain sum to a railway com- they engage for."
This case comes
pany to carry goods to a place beyond
fully up to the English rule laid, down in
a the terminus of their road. In thereceipt
Muschamp v. Lancaster Railway, cited
the contracting company expressly stipu- supra. See also Fairchild
v. Slocum, 19
lated that they would not hold themselves
Wend. 329, and Hart v. RensselaerRailliable for loss by fire. The goods were
road Co., 4 Seld. 37. 13ut in St. John
subsequently burnt while on a connecting
v. Van Santvoord et al., 25 Wend. 660,
road, and in a suit for damages against
the facts were these. The plaintih, St.
the connecting company, the doctrine John, without
any conlract, put on beard
above laid down, that 'the original Com- defendants' boat plying between New
pany is the only contracting party, and York and Albany,
a box directed ".
that it is alone responsible for losses, was Petrie, Little Falls,Herkimer Co.," and
pushed to the extent of holding that the took a receipt in that
form. On the
express stipulationof the original carrier arrival of the
boat at Albany, the box
would protect all connecting companies, was placed on beard of a canal-boat
although the case was one in which a going to Utica, the freight to Albany
common carrier was undoubtedly liable, being paid by the master of the canaland nothing but an express agreement boat; the box was lost after leaving
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Albany. It was ptoved on the trial that
it was the custom of all boats plying on
the Hudson, when they took packages
from New York, directed to places west
or north of Albany, to intrust them to
canal-boats at Albany, to be carried to
such places. Knowledge of the custom,
and that the defendants' line terminated
at Albany, was not brought home to the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court, reversing
the court below, NELsox, J., delivering
the opinion, says, "the court erred in
charging that custom and the usage of
trade determined the rights of the parties
where there was no evidence of a contract, express or implied, to carry the
goods beyond Albany. Such a contract
is fairly to be inferred from the receipt.
The direction indicated to whom the
plaintiff wished to send the box, and the
defendants receiving it without any qualification and receipting for it, is, in effect,
saying we will deliver it according to the
direction, and so the plaintiff must undoubtedly have understood the contract."
This is a just and reasonable view of the
transaction, and it seems but equitable
that a carrier who does not limit his
responsibility, at the time of receiving a
package addressed to a place beyond the
terminus of his route, and who fails to
notify the sender that he would only
carry it a certain distance, thereby misleading him, should be held liable in
case of loss ; this is also in accordance
with the previous decisions in this country and England.
And yet this case was reversed in the
Court of Errors and Appeals, 6 Hill
157. Chancellor WALWORTH, placing
the duty of notifying on the sender of
the goods.-" If the owner of goods
neglects to make the necessary inquiries
as to the custom or usage of the carrier,
or to give directions for their disposal, it
is his fault, and the loss, if any, after
the carrier has performed his duty according to the ordinary course of his business, mat fall on the owner."

In commenting on this case in Quimby
v. Vanderbilt, 3 Smith 306, DLNio, J.,
says, "the English rule, in my opinion,
was very wisely limited in Hartv. RensselaerRailroad, by holding that evidence
was admissible to show that by the course
of trade a transportation company receiving property without any special contract, only undertook to carry it over its
own road."

In Wilcox v. .Parmelee, however, 3
Sand. Ch. 610, it is expressly asserted
that where the carrier agrees to carry the
goods to a place beyond the terminus of
his route, and receives compensation
therefor, he is liable for a loss on a connecting road, and that the evidence of
such an agreement is the giving of a
receipt for such place and the collection
of the freight. All doubt, however, in
such a conflict of authority, was set at
rest by the enactment of a statute to
meet the point, at least as far as railroads
are concerned, 2 R. S. § 67, 693. The
language is, "whenever two or more
railroads are connected together, any
company owning either road and receiving freight to be transported to a place
on the line of the other, shall be liable as
common carriers,for the delivery of such
freight at such place." Seethe lastcase
on this subject, Smith v. AVow York Central Railroad Co., 43 Barb. 225.
In Pennsylvania the rule was laid
down by Judge STmouD, in the District
Court of Philadelphia, Jenneson v. Camden and Amboy Railroad Co., 4 Am.
Law Reeg. 234. Jenneson delivered a
chest to the defendants at Burlington,
N. J., to be carried to Camden, Ohio,
and took a receipt in the following form.
"Received from M. Jenneson, a chest
marked as per margin, which we promise
to deliver at our office in New York upon
payment of freight." On the margin
was written, "To be shipped for Camden,
Ohio, from New York." The plaintiff
offered to pay the freight, but defendants
said it might be settled for at the end of
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the line. The chest was lost, and in an
action for damages, the plaintiff having
declared on a contract to carry the chest
from Burlington to Camden, and offering
the receipt in evidence of the contract,
was nonsuited on the ground of the probata and allegata not agreeing. STRouD,

J., sustained the nonsuit, and in his
opinion was evidently inclined to the
doctrine that in the absence of a special
contract, a carrier receiving goods
directed to a place beyond the terminus
of his route, would not be liable for their
loss on a connecting line, and cited with
marked approbation Van Santvoord v.
St. John, and Nutting v. Connecticut
River RailroadCo., 1 Gray 502. In the
latter case, where goods were shipped by
the plaintiff from Northampton in Massachusetts to New York, over the defendants' road, which only extended part of
the distance, the freight being paid only
to the terminus of the defendants' road, in
a suit for the value of the goods, which
were lost on a connecting road, it is laid
down by METCALFE, J., as law, "that
where common carriers receive goods
destined to a place beyond the terminus
of their route, and take pay only for
transportation over their own road, their
obligation is simply to transport them
safely to the end of their route; for if
they can be held liable for a loss happening on any road but their own, we know
not what would be the limit of their
responsibility." He also expresses his
disapproval of the doctrine of Muschamp
v. LancasterRailway Co., supra.
If the learned judge only meant to say
that it was capable for a common carrier
receiving goods, directed to a place beyond the terminus of his route, to limit
his responsibility to such route by special
agreement, he was undoubtedly correct
in the assertion, and even the English
cases recognise this; but if he meant to
decide that where goods are received
without any agreement expressed, and

are directed to a place beyond the termi.
nus of a carrier's route, he is not liable
on an implied agreement, evidenced from
his receipt of the goods knowing them
to be destined to a place beyond his
road, it is the very question at issue,
and the form in which it usually arises.
In The .FTitchburg6- Worcester Railroad Co. v. Hanna, 6 Gray 539, it was
held that where several connecting railroads affirmed that they were jointly
entitled to freight earned by bringing
suit in the name of a common agent,
they would be responsible for a loss, on
whatever part of the line it happened,
on a contract by their agent. But in
Briggs v. Boston 4- Lowell Railroad
Co., 6 Allen 216, the court affirmed the
former opinion, that a carrier was only
liable as a forwarder for goods to be
transported beyond the terminus of his
route, after they had reached-said terminus.
The rule is the same in Connecticut
as in Massachusetts, that in the absence
of a special contract, a carrier will not
be liable beyond the terminus of his
route, and the giving of a receipt fox
the whole distance, and receiving the
full amount of carriage-money, will not
be considered evidence of such special
contract: Hood v. New Yoik 4- New
Haven Railroad, 22 Conn. 1 ; Elsmore
v. The Naugatuck Railroad, 23 Conn.
457.

In the last case, ELLswoxT,

J.,

delivering the opinion of the court,
says, "We cannot think that a railroad
company, simply receiving goods directed to a place beyond the terminus of
their road, enter into an implied agreement to deliver them at such place, and
we agree with the courts of Massachusetts in their dissent from the English
rule of Muschamp v. Lancaster Railway. 7

It was intimated by Chief Justice
in Sprague v. Smith, that
the rule as to the liability of a common
REiFrLD,
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carrier, for a loss occurring on a connecting line, was different in regard to
passengers and freight, and that there
was no liability for the former beyond
the end of the original carrier's road:
29 Vt. 421. However, in Buntnall v.
The SaratogaRailroad,32 Vt. 665, this
distinction, if it existed, was not alluded
to, and the broad rule was maintained
that carriers were not liable for goods
lost while on a connecting line. See
Quimit v. Renshaw, 35 Vt. 605.
Judge DAvis, in Perkins v. Portland
Saco Railroad Co., 47 Me. 573, after
holding that the law in this country is
different from Wvhat it is in England,
says, "Although without a special contract a carrier is not liable for a loss on
a connecting line, still we think he may
be bound if, by his agent, he holds himself out to the public as a common carrier to a place beyond the limits of his
route; and where the agent has no express authority to make such a contract,
it may be implied from a mutual arrangement for the carrying business
amongst all the carriers between where
the goods are received and the place of
delivery." In the case in point a receipt for the whole distance was given,
but no freight advanced, nor any sum
agreed upon.
In Angle 6- Co. v. The Aississippi
Railroad, 9 Iowa 487, merchandise was
delivered to the defendants at Muscatine,

marked "Cedar Rapids, Iowa," freight
to be collected on delivery: the defendants' road only went to Iowa City,
twenty-five miles from Cedar Rapids,
and the rest of the distance had to be
madeinwagons. WOODWARD, 3.,says,
"We are clearly of the opinion that
where goods are delivered to a railroad
company marked to a place beyond their
road, and unaccompanied by any direction but tte mark, the company is bound
to deliver according to the mark, although parol evidence is admissible to
vary the contract, as it is only primd
facie evidence from the receipt that they
undertook to carry the whole distance,
and the company would be exempt if an
unvarying usage to deliver at the terminus of their road was proved, and knowledge of such usage brought home to the
consignor."
The rule that the original carrier is
liable for losses occurring beyond the
terminus of his route, is the law in South
Carolina (Kyle v. The Laurens Railroad
Co., 10 Riehd. 382) and also in Tennessee: Carter-v. Peck, 4 Sneed 203.
From the foregoing it will appear that
the rule in England is undoubted to hold
the contracting carrier liable for all
losses occurring on any road with which
he connects, and in this country that how.ever it may vary in the different states,
the current ofopinion is decidedly in favcr
W. W. W.
of the English rule,-
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Supreme Court of the United States.
THE CHENANGO BRIDGE COMPANY v. THE BINGHAMITON
BRIDGE COMPANY.
A provision in an act of a state legislature incorporating a bridge company, that
it shall not be lawful for any other person to build a bridge within two miles of th
company's bridge, is a contract within the protection of the Constitution of thb
United States, and deprives any subsequent legislature of the right to authorize
such bridge at any other time.
The act of the New York Legislature incorporating the Susquehanna Bridge
Company (1805, ch. 89, § 38), made applicable to the Chenango Bridge Company
(1808, ch. 119), and giving it all the "rights, privileges," &c., of the Delaware
Bridge Company, entitles it to the benefit of a provision in favor of the latter company that no bridge should be erected within two miles of its bridge across the
fDelaware, so as to guarantee the Chenango Bridge Company against the erection
of a bridge within the like distance of its bridge over the Chenango.

IN error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, from
a judgment entered on the remittiturfrom the Court of Appeals
of said state. (27 N. Y. Reports 87.)

Henry B. Hygatt, for plaintiff in error.
-DanielS. BDickinson, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Constitution of the United States declares
that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, and the 25th section of the Judiciary Act provides that
the final judgment or decree of the highest court of a state, in
which a decisioh in a suit can be had, may be examined and
reviewed in this court, if there was drawn in question in the suit
the validity of a statute of the state, on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and the decision was in favor of its validity.
The plaintiffs in error brought a suit in equity in the Supreme
Court of New York, alleging that they were created a corporation by the legislature of that state, on the 1st of April, 1808, to
erect and maintain a bridge across the Chenango river, at Binghamton, with perpetual succession, the right to take tolls, and a
covenant that no other bridge should be built within a distance of
two miles either way from their bridge; which was a grant in the
nature of a contract that cannot be impaired: The complaint of
DAvIs, J.-The
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the bill is, that notwithstanding the Chenango Bridge Company
have faithfully kept their contract with the state, and maintained
for a period of nearly fifty years a .safe and suitable bridge for
the accommodation of the public, the legislature of New York, on
the 5th of April, 1855, in plain violation of the contract of the
state with them, authorized the defendants to build a bridge across
the Chenango river within the prescribed limits, and that the
bridge is built and open for travel.
The bill seeks to obtain a perpetual injunction against the Bing-.
hamton Bridge Company, from using or allowing to be used the
bridge thus built, on the sole ground that the statute of the state,
which authorizes it, is repugnant to that provision of the Constitution of the United States, which says that no state shall pass
any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Such proceedings
were had in the inferior courts of New York, that the case finally
reached and was heard in the Court of Appeals, which is the
highest court of law or equity of the state, in which a decision of
the suit could be had. And that court held that the act by virtue
of which the Binghamton bridge was built was a valid act, and
rendered a final decree dismissing the bill. Everything, therefore, concurs to bring into exercise the appellate power of this
court over cases decided in a state court, and to support the writ
of error, which seeks to re-examine and correct the final judgment of the Court of Appeals in New York. The questions presented by this record are of importance, and have received
deliberate copsideration.
It is said that the revising power of this court over state adjudications is viewed with jealousy. If so, we say, in the words of
Chief Justice MARSHALL, "1that the course of the judicial department is marked out by law. As this court has never grasped at
ungranted jurisdiction, so it never will, we trust, shrink from that
which is conferred upon it." The constitutional right of one
legislature to grant corporate privileges and franchises, so as to
bind and conclude a succeeding one, has been denied. We have
supposed, if anything was settled by an unbroken course of decisions in the Federal and state.courts, it was that an act of incorporation was a contract between the state and the stockholders.
All courts at this day are estopped from questioning the doctrine.
The security of property rests upon it, and every successful enter-
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prise is undertaken in the unshaken belief that it will never be
forsaken.
A departure from it now would involve dangers to society that
cannot be foreseen, would shock the sense of justice of the coun
try, unhinge its business interests, and weaken if not destroy that
respect which has always been felt for the judicial department of
the government. An attempt even to re-affirm it could only tend
to lessen its force and obligation. It received its ablest exposi.tion in the case of -DartmouthCollege v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton,
which case has ever since been considered a landmark by the profession, and no court has since disregarded the doctrine that the
charters of private corporations are contracts, protected from
invasion by the Constitution of the United States. And it bas
since so often received the solemn sanction of this court that it
would unnecessarily lengthen this opinion to refer to the cases, or
even enumerate them.
The principle is supported by reason as well as authority. It
was well remarked by the chief justice, in the Dartmouth College
case, that "the objects for which a corporation is created are universally such as the government wishes to promote. They are
deemed beneficial to the country, and this benefit constitutes the
consideration, and in most cases the sole consideration for the
grant." The purposes to be attained are generally beyond the
ability of individual enterprise, and can only be accomplished
through the aid of associated wealth. This will not be risked
unless privileges are given and securities furnished in an act of
incorporation. The wants of the public are often so imperative
that a duty is imposed on government to provide for them, and as
experience has proved that a state should not directly attempt to
do this, it is necessary to confer on others the faculty of doing
what the sovereign power is unwilling to undertake. The legislature, therefore, says to public-spirited citizens: If you will embark with your time, money, and skill, in an enterprise which will
accommodate the public necessities, we will grant to you, for a
limited period, or in perpetuity, privileges that will justify the
expenditure of your money and the employment of your time and
skill. Such a grant is a contract with mutual considerations, and
justice and good policy alike require that the protection of the
law should be assured to it. It is argued, as a reason why courts
should not be rigid in enforcing the contracts made by states, that
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legislative bodies are often overreached by designing men, and
dispose of franchises with great recklessness.
If the knowledge that a contract made by a state with individuals is equally protected from invasion, as a contract made
between natural persons, does not awaken watchfulness and care
oi the part of lawmakers, it is difficult to perceive what would.
The corrective to improvident legislation is not in the courts, but
is to be found elsewhere.
A great deal of the argument at the bar was devoted to the
consideration of the proper rule of construction to be adopted in
the interpretation of legislative contracts. In this there is no
difficulty. All contracts are to be construed to accomplish the
intention of the parties; and, in determining their different provisions, a liberal and fair construction will be given to the words,
either singly, or in connection with the subject-matter. It is not
the duty of a court, by legal subtlety, to overthrow a contract,
but rather to uphold it and give it effect; and no strained or artificial rule of construction is to be applied to any part of it. If
there is no ambiguity, and the meaning of the parties can be
clearly ascertained, effect is to be given to the instrument used,
whether it is a legislative grant or not. In the case of Te
Ukarles River Bridge, 11 Peters, the rules of construction
known to the English common law were adopted and applied in
the interpretation of legislative grants, and the principle was
recognised that charters are to be construed most favorably to
the state, and that in grants by the public nothing passes by implication. This coiurt has repeatedly since re-asserted the same
doctrine; and the decisions in the several states are nearly all
the same way. The principle is this: that all rights which are
asserted against the state must be clearly defined, and not raised
by inference or presumption; and if the charter is silent about a
power, it does not exist. If, on a fair reading of the instrument.
reasonable doubts arise as to the proper interpretation to be given
to i., those doubts are to be solved in favor of the state; and
where it is susceptible of two meanings, the one restricting, and
the other extending the powers of the corporation, that construction is to be adopted which works the least harm to the state.
But if there is no ambiguity in the charter, and the powers conferred are plainly marked, and their limits can be readily ascertained, then it is the duty of the court to sustain and uphold it,
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and to carry out the true meaning and intention of the palties to
it. Any other rule of construction would defeat all legislative
grants, and overthrow all other contracts. What, then, are the
rights of the parties to this controversy ?
In 1805 the state of New York passed an act, in forty-two
sections, creating five different corporations. The main purpose
of the act was, at that early day, to secure for the convenience
of the public, good turnpike roads; but the country was new,
the undertaking hazardous, the roads crossed large and rapid
streams, and the legislature, in its wisdom, thought proper to
create two separate and distinct bridge incorporations, with larger
powers than were conferred on the turnpike corporations.
The preamble to the thirty-second section declares the motives
and purposes of the legislature. It was feared that the heavy
freshets and dangerous obstructions to which the streams were
subject would endanger the permanency of the bridges, and
require a frequent renewal of the whole capital, and that the
corporations for erecting the bridges should be relieved from the
policy of reversion, which attached to the corpotations for constructing the turnpike roads, and that full powers, adequate to
the execution of the work in the best manner, should be assured
to those citizens who would successfully accomplish the building
of the bridges. It is impossible to read this recital and escape
the conclusion that the legislature thought the enterprise did not
promise present remuneration, and that large powers and exclusive privileges must be given to get the stock taken and the
bridges built. It is evident that what was then considered a
great scheme of internal improvement was in the minds of the
legislature. Such a scheme was, at that early period in the history of the state, not of easy solution. It required more energy
and foresight, and involved greater hazard, in the commencement
of this century, to build turnpike roads through an unbroken
wilderness, and erect bridges over dangerous streams, than it
,would now to checker the surface of a state with railways.
These considerations are great helps in arriving at a correct
knowledge of the intention of the legislature and in giving a
proper construction to the grants that were made. For it should
never be lost sight of that the main canon of interpretation of a
contract is to ascertain what the parties 1hemselves meant and
understood. In order to connect the turnpike roads, it was neces.
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sary to cross the east and west branches of the Delaware, the
Susquehanna, and Ohenango rivers. These streams were all in
the same category. The work of improvement was incomplete
until each was spanned with substantial bridges; and there is
nothing to show that the dangers apprehended, and which formed
the inducements to the grant of large powers, did not apply to all
of them alike. Fifteen sections of the act are devoted to the
creation of the Delaware Bridge Company, for the purpose of
erecting bridges over the east and west branches of the Delaware
river, with the usual faculties, powers, and incidents of a corporation, and subject to the usual duties, regulations, restraints,
and penalties. The duration of the company was limited to thirty
years, and competing bridges or ferries, within the prescribed
limits of two miles above and below, were forbidden. These were
important privileges, and justified by the peculiar circumstances
of the country; and it is easy to see that without them prudent
men would not have engaged in the enterprise. The Delaware
Bridge Company having been constituted with great minuteness
of detail, a few words and a single section sufficed to bring into
existence the Susquehanna Bridge Company. The thirty-eighth
section of the act created the latter corporation, to erect and
maintain toll-bridges across the Susquehanna and Chenango
rivers at certain localities, and further declared that the " Susquehanna Bridge Company be, and hereby are, invested with all
and singular the powers, rights, privileges, immunities, and advan.
tages, and shall be subject to all the duties, regulations, restraints,
and penalties which are contained in the foregoing incorporation
of the Delaware Bridge Company; and all and singular the
provisions, sections, and clauses thereof not inconsistent with
the particular provisions therein contained, shall be, and hereby
are, fully extended to the president and directors of this corporation."
No one can read the entire act through and fail to perceive that
the legislature intended to create two bridge corporations, exactly
similar in all material respects. Protection was alike necessary
to both; the public wants required both; the scheme of improve.
ment embraced both; the danger of present loss applied to both;
and there were the same motives to give valuable franchises to
both.
The inquiry, then, is, has the legislature used language that
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clearly conveys that intention ? and on this point we entertain no
doubt.
It is not questioned that the provision limiting the Delaware
charter to thirty years, was carried into the Susquehanna charter:
but it is denied that the prohibition against competition was also
imported.
The clause in the Delaware charter on that subject is in the following words: "that it shall not be lawful for any person, or
persons, to erect any bridge, or establish any ferry, across the
said west and east branches of the Delaware river, within two
miles, either above or below the bridges to be erected and maintained in pursuance of this act." This was, undoubtedly, a covenant with the Delaware Company that they should be free from
competition within the prescribed limits. It is argued, because
the east and west branches of the Delaware are named, that the
prohibition was not intended to reach the Susquehanna Company.
But this construction is narrow and technical, and would defeat
the very end the legislature had in view. It is true, there were
certain minor provisions in the Delaware charter, which were
peculiar to it, and of course it would be absurd to suppose that
they were transferred, or intended to be transferred to the Susquehanna Company, but by the terms of the law whatever provisions were applicable, were extended to the latter company. It
easy to see that the legislature never meant that the judges of
Delaware county, who were to visit and inspect the Delaware
bridges, should also visit and inspect the Susquehanna, because
there were similar officers in Tioga county where the Susquehanna
bridges were located. But the privilege against competition was
applicable to both corporations, and, in the unsettled state of the
country, necessary to the existence of both, for the legislature
well knew, that it would be madness for adventurers to build tollbridges in a new country, where travel was limited and settlers
few, if the right was retained to authorize other adventurers, to
build other bridges so near as to divide even that limited travel.
The form adopted in making the grants has weight, in arriving at
the true legislative intention, and it is worthy of consideration.
that it is not unusual in the legislation of this country, to grant
vast powers in a short act, by referring to, and adopting the provisions of other corporations of like purposes. In fact, some of the
great enterprises of the day have sprung into existence, and dis-
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tributed their blessings, by virtue of legislation similar to that
which created the Susquehanna Bridge Company. The object is
apparent, not to encumber the statute book by useless repetition
and unnecessary verbiage. The legislature of New York, at
great length, and with commendable care and circumspection,
incorporated the Delaware Company, and then to avoid repetition,
gave to the Susquehanna Company all the rights and advantages,
which in the same act were conferred on the Delaware corpo
ration. This was enough, but in fear of cavil, and to avoid
any misconstruction, and out of superabundant caution,, it was
declared that all the provisions, sections, and clauses in the Delaware charter, not inconsistent with the particular provisions of the
Susquehanna charter, should be fully extended to the president
and directors of the latter corporation. There were no inconsistencies between the two corporations, except such as would arise
from difference in locality, and in every other respect the corporations were alike. Each was to bridge two streams, and each
needed and did receive the fostering care of the legislature.
When it is conceded, as it must be, that a franchise which. prohibits competition is an advantage, and that it was enjoyed by the
Delaware Company, and that there is nothing in the peculiar provisions of the Susquehanna charter which prevents that company
from enjoying it, then it is conferred, and there is an end to controversy.
The history of the subsequent legislation of the state, on the
subject of these bridges, is explanatory of the intention of the
legislature of 1805, and confirmatory of the view already taken.
In 1808, the Susquehanna and Chenango bridges were not built,
and longer time and greater privileges were required to insure the
success of that enterprise. The legislature in fear that the scheme
of internal improvement, which was not complete *without the
bridges, would fail, furnished still greater inducements to the parties proposing to erect them. The thirty years' limitation was
repealed, and the charter made perpetual, and the time limited for
building the bridges was extended four years. And these provisions of the Susquehanna charter, which were thus altered and
treated by the legislature of 1808 as belonging to it, were, if part
of it, imported from the Delaware charter. Can it be supposed
for one moment, that when the Susquehanna Company waa
demanding higher privileges in order to live, that it was the inten-
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tion of the legislature to deprive it of the right to shut out competition, with which the Delaware Company was invested, and which
was nearly as valuable as the right to take tolls.
The intention of the legislature was manifest, to confer on the
Susquehanna corporation all the advantages enjoyed by the Delaware Company that were applicable to it and consistent with the
different locality it occupied; and the language used, in our opinion, gives effect to that intention; and the two-mile restriction is
as much a part of the charter of the Susquehanna Company as
if it had been directly inserted in it. It is argued that the
restriction cannot apply to the Chenango bridge, because it is located less than two miles from the confluence of the Chenango river
with the Susquehanna. But the restriction is for two miles, either
above or below the bridges, and is applicable to a bridge built
above, and within the prohibitory limits, although a question
might arise whether it was extended to a bridge which was built
below the junction of the streams. The Susquehanna Company,
by the original charter, were to erect bridges over both the Susquehanna and Chenango rivers; but, with the amendments which
were made in 1808, it was declared to exist for the sole purpose
of building and maintaining a bridge over the Susquehanna, V.hile
at the same time the privilege of bridging the Chenango was given
to "The Chenango Bridge Company," a new corporation, created
with the same faculties and franchises, and subject to the same
duties and restrictions as the Susquehanna corporation. The construction which has been given to the Susquehanna charter is,
necessarily, a solution of all questions pertaining to the charter
of the Chenango Bridge Company. The legislature, therefore,
contracted with this company, if they would build and maintain a
safe and suitable bridge across the Chenango river at Chenango
Point, for the accommodation of the public, they should have, in
consideration for it, a perpetual charter, the right to take certain
specified tolls, and that it should not be lawful for any person or
persons to erect any bridge or establish any ferry within a distance
of two miles on the Chenango river, either above or below their
bridge. Has the legislature of 1855 broken the contract, which
the legislatures of 1805 and 1808 made with the plaintiffs ?
The foregoing discussion affords an easy answer to this question.
The legislature has the power to license ferries and bridges, and
so to regulate them, that no rival ferries or bridges can be estab.
lished within certain fixed distances.
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No individual without a license can build a bridge or establish
a ferry for general travel, for "1it is a well-settled principle of
common law that no man may set up a ferry for all passengers,
without prescription time out of mind, or a charter from the king.
He may make a ferry for his own use, or the use of his family,
but not for the common use of all the king's subjects passing that
way, because it doth in consequence tend to a common charge
and is become a thing of public interest and use; and every ferry
ought to be under a public regulation :" Harg. L. T., ch. ii. 16;
17 Conn. 63; 20 Johns. 100; 2 McLean 383.
As there was no necessity of laying a restraint on unauthorized
persons, it is clear that such a restraint was not within the meaning of the legislature.
The restraint was on the legislature itself. The plain reading
of the provision, '" that it shall not be lawful for any person or
persons to erect a bridge within a distance of two miles," is, that
the legislature will not make it lawful by licensing any person,
or association of persons, to do it. And the obligation includes a
free bridge as well as a toll bridge, for the security would be
worthless to the corporation if the right by implication was reserved, to authorize the erection of a bridge which should be free
to the public. The Binghamton Bridge Company was chartered
to construct a bridge for general road travel, like the Chenango
Bridge, and near to it, and within the prohibited distance. This
was a plain violation of the contract which the legislature made
with the Chenango Bridge Company, and as such a contract is
within the protection of the constitution of the United States, it
follows that the charter of the Binghamton Bridge Company is
null and void.
The decree of the Court of Appeals of New York is reversed,
and a mandate is ordered to issue, with directions to enter a judgment for the plaintiff in error, the Chenango Bridge Company, in
cQnformity with this opinion.
NIhsoN, J., did not sit in the argument of this cause, on account
of sickness.
GRIER, J., dissenting.-I feel conitrained to dissent from the
opinion of the majority of my brethren, which has just been read.
The general principles 'of law, as connected with the question
involved in the case, are, no doubt, correctly stated, as to the
strict construction of statutes as against corporations claiming
VOL.
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rights so injurious to the public. But my objection is, that they
have not been properly applied to the case before us.
The power of one legislature to bind themselves and their pos.
terity, and all future legislatures, from authorizing a bridge
absolutely required for public use, might well be denied by the
courts of New York; and as a construction of their own constitu°
tion, we would have no right to sit in error upon their judgment.
But assuming such a power for one legislature to restrain the
power of future legislatures, those who assert that it has been
exercised must prove their assertion beyond a doubt. Such intention must be clearly expressed in the letter of the statute, and
not left to be discovered by astute construction and logical inferences. Although an act of incorporation may be called a contract,
the rules of construction applied to it are admitted to be the
reverse of those applied to other contracts. Yet the opinion of
the court, whilo admitting the rule of construction, proceeds on a
contrary hypothesis, and with great ingenuity, and astute reasoning, has given a construction most favorable to the monopolist,
and injurious to the people.
To regard the general language of this act of incorporation as
first bringing from the east and west branches of the Delaware to
the Susquehanna company, a provision as to what it should not
be lawful for any person or persons to do, and then as bringing it
from the Susquehanna company, and incorporating in the charter
of the Chenango Bridge Company a clause that "it shall not be
lawful for any person or persons to erect any bridge, or establish
any ferry across the ' west' and ' east' branches of the Delaware
river, within two miles, either above or below the bridge," and
make it read so as to apply to the Chenango river, with a single
stream two miles above, and one-fourth of a mile (its entire extent)
below, and then apply to the Susquehanna for one mile and threefourths further down, and, at the same time, get rid of the thirty
years' limitation in the Delaware charter, is, I think, going an
unusual and irrational stretch beyond all ordinary rules of construction in such cases.
It seems to me that the fact that it required so ingenious and
labored an argument by my learned brother to vindicate such a
construction of the act in question, is, itself, conclusive evidence
that such construction should not be given to it.
CHASE, C. J., and FID, J., concurred.

COMMONWEALTH v. STRODE.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOSEPH C. STRODE,
EXECUTOR OF CALEB STRODE, DECEASED.

United States stocks and bonds are subject to a state collateral inheritance tax,
like other property in similar circumstances.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WOODWARD, C. J.-The single question is whether our collateral inheritance tax is applicable to that part of the decedent's
estate which consisted of bonds of the United States, that were
by law exempted from state taxation. And the opinion of the
learned judge below is so satisfactory, as to leave very little for
us to add.
The mistake of the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error consists, we conceive, in treating this as a tax of the government
bonds, when it is really a tax upon a decedent's estate dying
without lineal heirs. And it does not help the argument that the
bulk of the estate is made up of these bonds, for that estate passed
into the hands of the executor for administration, and is taxed in
his hands as an estate. The law takes every decedent's estate
into custody, and administers it for the benefit of creditors, legatees, devisees, and heirs, and delivers the residue that remains,
after discharging all obligations, to the distributees entitled to
receive it. One of the legal obligations to which every estate
that is to go to collateral kindred is subject, is this five per cent.
duty to the commonwealth. And it is not until this work of
administration is performed, that the right of succession attaches.
The distributees may indeed consent to accept certain goodi and
chattels in specie without conversion, as is frequently done in settleiment of estates; but such arrangements nowise affect the'
theory of the law, that the estate is first to be administered and
then enjoyed.
Now this five per cent. tax is one of the conditions of administration, and to deny the right of the state to impose it is to deny
the right of the state to regulate the administration of decedents'
goods. If an estate consist wholly of federal bonds and is indebted,
conversion of them into money is necessary to pay the debts, and
nobody would doubt that the sum that remained after payment of
debts would be subject to a deduction of five per cent. for the use
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of the state. But suppose the federal bonds be used to pay tho
only indebtedness that exists, and a residue of estate remains for
distributees, is it not to pay the collateral inheritance tax ?
Clearly it must, though it may be less than the aggregate of
the bonds. This act operates on the residue of the estate after
paying debts and charges, and theoretically that residue is always
a balance in money. The administration account always exhibits
a balance in cash, not in specific goods, whether bonds or horses ;
and though an heir may take bonds or horses as cash, the account
must show, and always does show, a cash balance. That is the
fund taxed by this law, and not the bonds or other chattels which
may have produced the fund. Therefore, neither the prohibitory
clause of the Act of Congress of 1862, nor any of the principles
of decision against state authority to tax that which federal authority has exempted from taxation, has any application here. The
federal government has not prohibited the states from prescribing
rules of inheritance and succession to estates of decedents, and it
would be grievous mistake of legislation and judicial authority to
apply it with such effect.
The judgment is affirmed.
READ, J., dissenting.-The United States bonds which in this
case are sought to be subjected to the collateral inheritance tax,
were issued under the second section of the Act of Congress of
the 25th February 1862, 12 Stat. at L^ 345, which provides, that
"all stocks, bonds, and other securities of the United -States, held
by individuals, corporations, or associations, within the United
States, shall be exempt from taxation by or under state authority."
Thesb words are perfectly clear, and no doubt has been expressed
but that this provision is constitutional.
By the Act relating to collateral inheritances, passed the 7th
April 1826, and its supplements, which are to be found in Brightly's Purdon under that title, page 148, &c., the legislature of
Pennsylvania, before these bonds were in existence, imposed a tax
or duty for the use of the commonwealth, of 5 on each and every
$100 of the clear value of all estates, real, personal, and mixed,
passing from any person who may die seised or possessed of such
estate being within this commonwealth, either by will or under the
Intestate Laws, or any part of such estate or estates or interest
therein, to any person or persons other than to or for the use of
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father, mother, husband, wife, children, and lineal descendants.
The words " being within the commonwealth" extend to all persons domiciled within this commonwealth at the time of their
decease, as well as to estates ; and persons having their domiciles
in another state, territory, or country, and dying leaving real or
personal estates within this commonwealth, the same shall be
subject to the payment of the collateral inheritance tax. In order
to fix the valuation, a fair and conscionable appraisement of the
personal estate of the decedent is to be made by an appraiser
appointed by the register of wills, which appraisement is final and
conclusive against the commonwealth: Comgaonwealth v. Freedley's Executors, 9 Harris 33. The tax is to be a lien on the property or estate chargeable with it, and the executors and administrators are also made liable for it. These are the provisions
applicable to the case before us, and it will be recollected that in
all these laws, nine in number, it is uniformly called a tax.
If, therefore, the state had subsequently created a new species
of security, and declared that it should be exempt from taxation,
it is clear that it would be exempted from the collateral inheritance tax. When, therefore, Congress by its paramount authority
created these securities, and declared that they should " be
exempt from taxation by or under state authority," the same
result must follow.
The collateral inheritance tax is a direct, positive act and exercise of the state taxing power, which is expressly prohibited from
reaching these bonds by the congressional declaration of exemption from state taxation of any kind whatever. The tax is a tax
only, and cannot be attributed to a supposed despotic power of
taking every man's property when he dies, to be exercised by th
legislature. I have never heard that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania claimed the right to confiscate the whole or any part of
a man's estate, simply because he was domiciled and died within
our borders. It is only a tax laid by the taxing power, and if so,
this decision should be reversed.

TAYLOR v. WINTERS.

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia.
TAYLOR v. WINTERS.
No new tenancy is created by a mere agreement for an increase of rent in the
middle of the year of the tenancy. The term stands unchanged, by a promise to
pay for a balance of a term, more rent than a tenant is required to pay by the con.
tract under which he entered into possession.
Such promise, unless supported by a good consideration, is a nudum pactum, and
cannot be enforced.

Opinion by ALLISON, P. J.
The judgment of the alderman is based on a clear mistake of the
legal effect of a promise made by a tenant during the term to pay an
increased rent for premises which he holds as lessee of his landlord.
The time originally agreed upon for the term to end, is not shifted
or varied by such promise. A modification of a contract of letting,
in the single particular of the amount of rent to be paid, does not
vary or alter the terms or conditions of the renting as to the time
when the term is to begin or end. The agreement remains in all
other respects as it was entered into between the lessor and lessee,
and such a change is not in law or in fact an abandonment by
either of the parties of any other right or duty which one could
claim for himself and against the other, under the terms of the
original contract.
Why should it be otherwise ? The term for which a lessee is
entitled to hold demised premises is not dependent upon the
amount of rent which he is required to pay to his landlord; whether the rent to be paid be more or less, it is of no consequence ;
that which is essential is, that a consideration should be paid for
the use and enjoyment of the property rented by the lessee from
the lessor. But if the rent to be paid be'a penny, it will as well
support the relation of landlord and tenant, and is in law as good
a consideration, as if the agreement be to pay 51000 or more.
It therefore follows, that the term for which premises were rented,
is not a condition or covenant dependent upon the quantum of
rent which the tenant has promised to pay and the lessor has
agreed to accept; but that it may be shifted up or down during
the term by the consent of the parties to the contract, without
changing the term as first established between them. And of so
little value is a mere promise made during a term by a tenant to
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give more, or of a landlord to take less rent for an unexpired por
tion of a term, that unless it be supported by a consideration
good in law, it is of no value, it is a mere nudum pactum, which
could not be enforced. If, however, such promise be properly
supported, like any other agreement good in law, it would bind
the parties as to that upon which it was intended to operate, and
no further. The remaining portions of the contract would stand
unaffected by an alteration of the amount of rent to be paid.
That which the parties for a sufficient consideration had agreed to
change, would be changed, that which the new agreement did not
cover would remain. A landlord and tenant may, by mutual consent, alter an agreement in part or in whole, but because they
agree to alter it in one particular, it does not follow as a legal
consequence that it is to be departed from in any other respect.
This point does not seem to have been adjudicated in Pennsylvania, nor have I been able to find a case anywhere, in which the
question has been directly presented for decision. Woodfall on
L. & T. 158, 266, 5th London edition, asserts the proposition that
no new tenancy is created by a mere agreement for an increase of
rent in the middle of a year bf the tenancy, and cites Bedford v.
Hendrick, Adams's Ejectment 144, but this case in Adams is
stated to have been decided at Warwick Summer Assizes 1810,
and is annotated as a MS. case merely, but upon the strength
of Bedford v. Kendrick, and the doctrine as it is found in
Woolfall, Adams also asserts the principle to be, that although no
new tenancy is created by amere agreement for an increase of
rent in the middle of a year of a tenancy, yet a notice to quit
after the receipt of increased rent must expire at the time when
the tenant originally entered.
Upon principle, however, without the aid of adjudicated cases,
we hold that the alderman erred in supposing that the promise of
the defendant, made before his term was ended, to pay an
increased rate of rent, which, by the contract under which he
went into possession, he was not required to pay, terminated his
tenancy at the time at which the increase was to begin, and that a
new year then started to run; and as upon this mistake he rested
his judgment, it must be reversed.

